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POLITICS, AUTHORITY AND PROPHECY IN MAIMONIDES 
Gershon Weiler 
I 
Maimonides (I 135-1204) was, apart from Spinoza who was hi most in-
cisive critic the greate t of Jewi h philo ophers. He wa al o, naturally 
enough, one of the most significant theori ts ever to deal with the pro-
blem that are the concern of this tudy. That he was a rather enigmatic 
thinker oon becomes apparent to anyone who embark upon a study of 
his works. He is o elusive that as Professor Pines remarked 1 any 
coherent interpretation of his philo ophy can b contradicted by 
evidence taken from some part of hi wriling . In addition to thi dif-
ficulty inherent in hi philo ophical work there is also the further pro-
blem that Maimonide was not only a philo opher but also a great 
perhaps the greatest codificr of the halakha and a halakhic authority 
himself. Thu one cannot avoid the question a to how these two very 
different area of his thinking are to be interrelated or, more precisely, to 
which of thee two enterpri es must primacy be accorded if one want to 
understand Maimonides' true intention . 
It must be remembered that Maimonide: was no armchair 
philosopher or cloi tered Talmudi t but the recognized leader of his com-
munity and a royal physician. ll wa in full consciou ne of his own im-
portance, a an exceptional individual, that he undenook to play, in ad-
dition to the pursuit of hi theoretical interest , the political role that 
communal leadership and the as umption of halakhic authority entailed. 
He wa in pired in doing ·o, by the notion of the Platonic philo opher-
king 2 an idea that had deci ive influence on hi thought in all matter 
pertaining to the topic of this chapter. A man who could ign his 
halakhic responsa with a laconic 'katav Moshe ('thu wrote Moses') 
could not be aid to have underestimated his own importance. 
The central problem of thi paper is a critical examination of 
Maimonides philo ophical ju tification of the foundations of the 
haJakha. I want to explain how 1 ee the relationship between 
Maimonides the philo opher and Maimonides the haJakhi t. My view i 
that Maimonides the halakhist takes precedence over Maimonides the 
philospher. As already aid, the philo opher was elusive. Whether this is 
a consequence of design or of the in. olubility of the problems he dealt 
with it i a fact that he offers contradictory an wers to the . ame ques· 
tions. Thi can be, and ha been, taken to be a literary device designed 
to make the work of the reader more difficult; it can also be held, a I am 
inclined to do that Maimonides wa genuinely wavering on many 
points of philo opbical theory. But he wa never ambiguou or wavering 
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about the absolute authority of the halakha. On this point his voice is 
alway clear and authoritative. 
Maimonides was too complex a character for it to be said of him that 
the sole motivation of his philosophical enquiries was to give 
philosophical support to the halakha. For it is quite obvious that he 
knew the delights of pure and rational speculation undertaken for its 
own sake. He was too much of a philosopher and a rationalist not to try 
to push ahead, as far as possible, towards the limits of human thought. 
He even attempted to find rational explanations for the halakhic com-
mandments (ta'amei mitsvoth); in this enterprise he was singularly un-
successful not so much in theory but in having his explanations ac-
cepted. Orthodoxy, which viewed his philosophizing with enough suspi-
cion to denounce his book to the Inquisition understood instinctively 
that obedience to commandments is not enhanced by making them ap-
pear rat ional. OrU10doxy also understood that even a very good 
philosophical justification of the halakha i an open in vitation to be 
refu ted. In the ca e of Maimonides this danger has materialized with 
Spinoza's devastating cri ticism of Maimonides' prophetology a subject 
that will occupy a sub tantial part of this paper. Yet, notwithstanding 
his phil ophical temperament, Maimonide never made the observance 
of command ments contingent upon the acceptance of their rational ex-
planation. The commandment he held, were absolutely obligatory, in-
dependently of their being explained or not. Of cour e, he liked it beller 
if he could explain them but he continued to hold them sacred even if he 
could not. As a halakhist, Maimonides was as rigorous as it is possible to 
be. 
As a philosopher, perhaps not even paradoxically, he was a sceptic. In 
saying this I am, of course, laying myself open to the charge that I am 
adopting one particular reading of Maimonides' philosophy against 
other, equally possible, readings. It is not my purpose to argue this point 
here in philosophically satisfactory detail but rather to point to the strik-
ing contrast between the sceptical conclusions of the philosophy of 
Maimonides and his far from sceptical assertions that he needs for laying 
the foundations of halakhic authority. The centre-piece of Maimonides' 
philosophical speculation is his doctrine of attributes. What this doctrine 
amounts to is this: God is so completely different from us that we can 
have no knowledge of His nature, no concept of how He really is. At 
best, we can know of God what He is not. But even for this doctrine to 
make sense Maimonides needs to take for granted the truth of Scripture. 
For example, Scripture says that God is merciful. Now, we do not know 
the nature of divine mercy but we can at least assert, on the basis of this 
scriptural statement, that God is not vindictive. Obviously, from a 
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purely logical point of view there is no reason to pick and choose our 
predicates if all we can do with them is to deny that they are applicable 
to God. Any predicate would fit that bill; the resulting position would be 
that of Eastern mystics who say: 'not this, not that'. But, even with 
Scripture to aid the selection of predicates, the position remains un-
satisfactory. If 'mercy' is incomprehensible to us because it is divine 
(mercyd') then its negation must be a divine concept too ('vindic-
tivenessd'); we understand the latter concept no more than we under-
stand the former. Aquinas who was well acquainted with this doctrine 
of Maimonides, criticized him on this point by noting that if 
Maimonides is right, then nothing whatever can be said of God. Hence 
the scepticism. 3 
What I consider important for our present purposes is that the same 
Maimonides who held that nothing can be positively asserted of God, 
could also assert not only that God revealed the Torah to Moses but also 
that it is absolutely certain that he will never appoint another prophet 
who will proclaim a Torah which is at variance with the one given on 
SinaL Of course, this is not a philosophical but an institutional doctrine. 
More will be said of this later. But it is important that we note that in-
stitutional necessity makes Maimonides say things that he could not 
possibly say on his own philosophical assumptions. 
It could be said, of course, that precisely because he had realized the 
limits of theoretical speculation, he was ready to augment, (or as I prefer 
to say: to set aside), the results of his speculation in favour of Scriptural 
authority. Leon Roth says that Maimonides' conception of Judaism 
rests 'not on metaphysics' but on history, namely the facts of creation, 
Abraham and the revelation on Sinai.4 But Maimonides, so interpreted, 
is open to two objections here. The one is that to accept creation, 
Abraham and Sinai as historical events is to accept things on faith alone. 
The other, and more serious, comment is that it is precisely here, on 
these points, that Maimonides deviates consciously from Aristotle 
whom he follows in all these things where his theories do not conflict 
with the demands of religion. It is not clear whether Maimonides denied 
the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of matter because it conflicted 
with the religious doctrine of creation ex nih i/o or for some other reason. · 
Maimonides, on this point, is exceptionally elusive. While he says that 
there is no difficulty in interpreting Scripture in a suitable way, yet he 
also says that on this issue he has no wish to avail himself of this inter-
pretative facility. 4• Anyway, it is reasonable to assume that had there 
been no such religious motivation, Maimonides would have retained the 
original theory of Aristotle. As for Moses, we shall soon see what 
violence Maimonides was prepared to do to the Aristotelian doctrine of 
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wisdom in order to endow the official founder of halakhic Judaism with 
those philosophical virtues that Scripture certainly does not claim on his 
behalf. And it is significant that in his account of prophecy Maimonides 
does not deem it worthy even to discuss the views of Epicurus 'who does 
not believe in the existence of God and so, a fortiori, he does not believe 
in prophecy either'.5 In other words, the existence of prophecy is taken 
for granted while, from a philosphical point of view, the real question is 
whether prophecy is possible at all. In this quest, surely, Epicurus 
deserved at least a hearing. Maimonides' interpretation of Scripture with 
regard to prophecy, as in other matters, aimed at giving a rationally ac-
ceptable account of what is written; an objective that frequently took 
the form of rejecting the literal meaning in favour of some other reading 
favoured by Maimonides. But he never reached the conclusion that 
anything in Scripture, on any interpretation, is philosophically unaccep-
table. 
Maimonides has the supreme merit of having spelt out, in more detail 
than anyone else, the assumptions that must be accepted if obedience to 
the halakha is to be vindicated. For this reason he occupies a central 
place in this study which aims at examining just these assumptions. 
II 
The Torah is intended to regulate life and, as such, its character can be 
described as political. At any rate, this is how quite a few commentators, 
including Strauss, understand Maimonides' meaning on the subject. The 
uniqueness of the Torah does not lie in its being political, in a sense yet 
to be determined, but in the contents of its prescriptions. Maimonides' 
own account of the function of the Torah places it firmly into the con-
text of, though in contrast to, the nomoi of the Gentiles that have an 
equally political aim. What Maimonides claims for the Torah is unique 
superiority, something that befits a system of laws that comes from God. 
That superiority, in turn, is explicated in terms taken from the Greek 
philosophical tradition and it is claimed by Maimonides, as it was by 
Philo, that the ideal state of the philosophers is realized in the Torah. 
What kind of state did Maimonides have in mind? Did he have in 
mind a state at all? Does not, perhaps, the literature on Maimonides that 
stresses the political nature of the Torah and of Maimonidean pro-
phetology, rest on a mistake?6 These are some of the problems that we 
shall deal with now. 
It is convenient to begin with a quotation from Leo Strauss' commen-
tary on a passage in Maimonides' textbook on logic where political 
science is being dealt with. 
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What he suggests then i that of all genuinely philosophic books 
only books on politics proper (and perhap on economics) have 
been rendered superfluou by the Torah. This implies that the 
function of the Torah i emphatically political. This interpretation 
is confirmed by the Guide for the Perplexed. In that work, 
Maimonides ay that the Torah gives only summary indication 
concerning theoretical subjects, whereas regarding the governance 
of the city, everytbjng has been done to make it precise in details.7 
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If this were so, we should expect to find in the Torah detailed laws con-
cerning government not only in respect of the historical circumstances 
in which Moses proclaimed his law but also for all future historical situa-
tions. This condition is essential for two reasons. One is that 'Torah' 
does not refer to Pentateuch only but in the tradition that Maimonides 
lived to the whole of the halakha· the second reason is that only if this 
condition is ati fied can it be claimed Lhat the Torah is the realization of 
the Platonic ideal state i.e. that it is a political arrangement which is so 
perfect that it is independent of time and place. Alternatively, it is possi-
ble that 'the Torah i not sufficient for the guidance of the political com-
munity'• and that, anyway, it is not needed by Jews in Exile. If this were 
the case then the nomoi of the Gentiles would be adequate to secure 
those political conditions that are necessary for the observance of the 
Torah. 
The basic difference, according to Maimonides, between the Torah 
and the nomoi is that the former care for the welfare of both soul and 
body while the latter is concerned only with the welfare of the body; cor-
respondingly, the Torah subordinates government to religion while the 
nomoi subordinate rejjgion to government.9 Given that the relationship 
between lhe welfare of the body and the welfare of the soul is that the 
former is a pre-condition of the latter, it would be natural to suppose 
that the welfare of the soul can be secured only in a political situation in 
which the welfare of the body is not the chief objective. In other words, 
the spiritual-rejjgious intentions of the Torah could be realized only in a 
state which is itself governed by the Torah. In states governed by nomoi 
there would be no hope of ob erving the Torah and to realize its ends. 
Quite clearly, Maimonides does not go this far in explicating the implica-
tions of the distinction he draws between the Torah and the nomoi. If he 
did, all his exhortations to observe the Torah, in the condition of 
political subjection to the Gentiles, would be strictly meaningless. And it 
is no less clear that Maimonides did not regard these exhortations as 
meaningless. He does not hold that the existence of a policy based on the 
Torah is the precondition for the observance of the Torah; from a 
religious point of view it is not necessary for Jews to have a state of their 
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own. Thus, the Torah, as it exists, can co-exist with nomoi and, whether 
it contains or not all that is necessary for the 'governance of the city', its 
prescriptions about such governance need not be abided by for it to be 
possible to be said that the Torah is observed. 
We are driven to the conclusion that there is an ambiguity in 
Maimonides' thought about the nature of the Torah. For, as shown by 
the previous argument, he must have held that the Torah can be observ-
ed even in states governed by nomoi and yet, in the Guide, he does pre-
sent the Torah as the constitutional foundation of the perfect state 
and/or society. The role of the prophet is to be a founder of this ideal 
state. 10 The claim that the Torah is the constitution of an ideal state is, at 
first sight, astonishing. What is ideal, we could ask, about the ideal state? 
What did Maimonides think the Torah has, which qualified it for the 
title 'ideal state'? Obviously enough, there is not much in common bet-
ween the substantive laws of the Torah and those proposed for the 
Greek utopia. And yet, I want to argue, Maimonides had a point when 
he spoke as if they had in common something of great importance. 
Strauss 11 and RosenthaJI2 both note that the political doctrines of 
Maimonides derive from Plato rather than from Aristotle. Moreover, 
the Plato who is most relevant here is not the Plato of the Republic but 
the Plato of the Laws. Yet, the similarity between the latter work and 
the Guide is not in the details. Just to give one example; Rosenthal 
notes13 that in Plato's Laws (709-710) the perfect ruler has seven at-
tributes while in the Guide (1.54) he has thirteen; and they are very dif-
ferent kinds of lists anyway. But there is one element in the Laws which 
is to be found in the Torah more than in the Republic. The last mention-
ed work has a doctrine of the philosopher-king but the king there really 
is a philosopher. His authority rests on the superiority of his knowledge 
which has been, and can again be, tested by way of dialectic i.e. rational 
argument. Thus, his authority is based on reason. The ruler of the true 
state in the Laws is different. 
For we do not appoint oxen to be lords of oxen, or goats of goats; 
but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over them . 
. . . the true state ought to be called by the name of God who rules 
over wise men. 14 
The ruler in the Laws is superior to the ruled in the same way as men are 
superior to oxen and goats; he rules on behalf of God, acquiring thereby 
the greatest possible authority. The inquisitorial nocturnal council 
represents divine truth and there can be no possible justification not to 
bow to its authority. Indeed, no one can aspire to belong to the ruling 
elite 'as a guardian of the law or .. . in the select order of virtue' who has 
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not rna tered the knowledge of the God which is 'one of the noblest 
ort of knowledge'.u Even prior to the establi hment of this ideal tate 
Plato how a clear preference for tyrants· they are so efficient. 11' 
It i thi characteri tic then, I suggest of the ideal state of Plato lhat 
mu t have appealed to Maimonide . Whether the Torah is the constitu-
tion of a tate or not, it certainly claim to be a legal system based on 
divine will and revelation and, consequently the administrators of the 
ystem are deemed to be doing God will. In such a ituation there can 
be no discus. ion on equal term between supporters and opponent of a 
certain rule of action since one of the sides is a divinely anctioned 
authority. The underlying a sumption is that there is a law which i 
perfect becau e it issue from a perfect being who, naturally enough 
cannot produc any law but a perfect one. The critic or objector is thus 
denied even the honour having rational ground for his po itiorr he 
lands revealed as a rebel. The per on who i a ubject in such a legal 
y tern must have only a much knowledge a is necessary to make him 
able to play hi a igned role. For Maimonides ' the best order of the 
oul consists in ound idea for the masses according to their capacity .17 
The ideal tate of Plato and the Torah of Maimonides are one in claim-
ing ab olute, because divine, authority. This, I uggest is the heart of the 
matter· it i thi that is 'ideal' in both Plato and Mairnonides. orrespon-
dingly tbe prophet needs to be made into the ideal ruler in order to 
become the visible depository of divine authority. 
It is easy to ee then why Maimonides preferred Plato to Ari totle on 
political matter . For Ari totle politic was an art admittedly 'the master 
art' 11 but being in art, Aristotle did not claim, on it behalf a he could 
not, the kind of absolute certainty that the authoritariani m of Plato and 
Maimonides required. 
Having then made clear what is the ideal' that the ideal tate of Plato 
and the Torah, as under tood by Maimonidcs have in common we can 
now turn to the following question: what i political about the Torah? 
In attempting to an wer thi question we must have a clo er look at the 
notion of the welfare of the body and of the soul that were mentioned 
already. Maimonide ay obviously echoing Aristotle, that man i 
naturally political. 19 What be means by thi i that man need the 
cooperation of others in order to satisfy hi need notably that of food 
and shelter. If there were no other with whom man could CO·operate 
he would be forced to spend all his time in providing necessitie for 
himself and, thus he would never have the leisure necessary for occupy-
ing himself with the virtues of the soul. Liberation from nece ·ity is a 
precondition of man being able to strive for hi true destiny, the alt.ain-
ment of the virtues of the soul that are higher than those of the body. 
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The virtues of the soul come first in value while 'in time and in nature' 
the welfare of the body comes first; once the welfare of the body is at-
tained man can aim at the virtues of the soul, knowledge among them.20 
Seeking the welfare of the body can be justified only to the extent that it 
is instrumental in securing the welfare of the soul. In other words, to 
seek the welfare of the body for its own sake is wrong; the justifiable 
limits of co-operation among men are determined by the criterion of 
utility from the point of view of spiritual welfare. 
Does it fo.llow from this that the political order, the sphere of the 
welfare of the body, must be of a particular kind? Is it the case that the 
political order, which is the precondition of being able to strive for the 
welfare of the soul, must be based on the Torah? Clearly, Maimonides 
thought that the welfare of tbe soul is the special domain of the Torah; 
did he think that its preconditions must also be organized according to 
the Torah? A brief glance at the kinds of needs that Maimonides men-
tion , as being satisfiable only by human co-operation, is sufficient to 
convince us that this is not so. indeed we can now see that what 
Maimonides really means is not that man i naturally political but that 
he is naturally social. For the needs that he speaks of are ocial needs 
and any political order whatever that secures the condition in which 
they can be satisfied .is perfectly in order. Mairnonides speaks of ocial 
needs a mere nece sities; there is no trace of a political ideal in his whole 
discussion on this point. 
The view that I am taking here is eloquently supported by Aristotle's 
remarks about man being a 'political animal'. The expression occurs 
quite a few times in Aristotle' writing . One passage, which is rather 
general, simply says that man is a political creature and one whose 
nature is to live with other 'Y Maimonides may be taken to be in accord 
with this passage but only because here Aristotle does not spell out what 
is the mode of living with others that is fitting for man. In other 
passages, however, Ari totle i perfectly clear about it that man is not 
merely a ocial but, in the full ense, a political animal. 'Man is born for 
citizenship'.22 The progress from household and village to state is no less 
natural than the creation of hou eholds and villages in the first place. 
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that 
man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not 
by mere accident is without state, is either a bad man or above 
humanity.23 
Moreover, it is not the view of Aristotle that politics is simply an instru-
ment of the satisfaction of man's material needs. For Aristotle, political 
life is a worthy end independently of its utility. 
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We have already said that man is by nature a political animal. And 
therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, 
desire to live together .. . 14 
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Significantly while Maimonides u ually empha ize the great difference 
between the Torah and the nomoi of the Gentile in hi explanation of 
the necessity of Jaws among human he almo t equates the two. Men are 
different, he say and unles there were laws the dissen ions that would 
naturally arise among them would make life impossible. Thus although 
the orah is not natural, it pertain to what i natural viz. the need of 
humans who are naturally different, for each other. The Torah 
equalizes these difference by laying down rules of conduct. or thi 
purpo,e a lawgiver i needed and here Maimonides refers lo, the pro· 
phet or he who lays down lhe nomosF.l That is, in ecuring the ba ic con-
ditions of the satisfactions of ocial need , i.e. law and order any ystem 
of Jaw will do that i effective in thi re pect. Thatlhis is indeed the view 
of Maimonides does not re t merely on this reading of an 'or'. or let us 
uppose that hi view is the oppo ite to the one outlined here. Then we 
would have to interpret Maimonides a aying that it i impo ible to at· 
tain lhe welfare of the soul under the rule of nomai and so, con equent-
ly, in that condition it is poinlles to trive for it. learly Maimonides 
cannot mean anything like that. He could not hold that the existence of 
a political, as contrasted with a social, order based on the Torah is a 
necessary precondition of the pur uit of spiritual or religious ends. Of 
course, the ali faction of these latter ends require. a degree of ocial co-
operation but it i not necessary that it should encompa the whole 
state. On the contrary, these social arrangemem , e.g. in the form f 
Jewi h community organizations, can very well exi t in a state of Gen-
tiles governed by nomoi. To say oLherwisc i to declare the Torah as 
totally impracticable in Exile. 
In terms of the Ari totelian doctrine of a sociations16 we could ay 
that the needs that Maimonides peak of are those that are atisfied in 
the two lower form of Aristotelian association, viz. the household and 
the union of everal hou cholds in the village. There i no need in 
Maimonides that is satisfied only in the Aristotelian third stage viz. the 
union of everal villages in the tate. There i a great deal in Maimonides 
about the welfare of the oul which notion could be taken to be akin Lo 
the Ari totelian notion of the good man and hi virtues. But there i 
nothing in Maimonides t parallel Aristotle's discussion of the good 
citizen who e virtue is that 'he hould know how to govern like a free 
man and how to obey like a free man .21 The Maimonidean 1 er on may 
be content to be the ubject of any state that ecures law and order but 
he need not think of himself a a citizen at all. 
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There are, of course, specific commandments in the Torah whose per-
formance is required only in the Land of Israel. But even these com-
mandment are politically neutral· they do not demand as their precon-
dition, Jewi h political independence but only the satisfaction of the 
geographic criterion. The commandments are obligatory in the Land of 
I. rael even under the political ru l of Gentiles. hey would not be 
obligatory anywhere el e even under Jewish political overeignty.28 
However mo l of the prescriptions of Lhe Torah are not only polilically 
but also geographically neutral· they are obligatory everywhere and 
their performance presuppose no particular kind of politica l order ex-
cept, of course one that permit and does not make their observance im-
P sible. We can conclude, therefore, that those commentators who 
read as propunding a political doctrine misread hi inten-
tions. Maimonides entertained, as we shall see, a vision of Messianic 
restoration. He regarded Exile as a condition inferior to sovereignty. He 
also believed in certain ideals as worthy of humans; and yet, none of 
these ideals were, in any ordinary sense, political ideals. The rejection of 
political role i implicit in Maimonide · analysi was needed to bring it to 
light. It will become explicit in the political philosophy of Abravanel. 
The di tinction that has been made here between the ocial and the 
political ha its origin in Hannah Arendt's discussion of the classica l con-
cept of politics.29 In clas ical antiquity 'he argues, the household was the 
social domain and it task wa the sa ti ·faction of necessi ty. It was an 
authoritarian and utilitarian arrangement; it was ruled by the head of 
the household as he saw fit. The political domain, by contrast, was the 
area of freedom where heads of households would meet on conditions of 
equality dealing with political matters that have nothing to do with 
neces ity. rom all U1at ha been aid it i clear that when Maimonides 
say that man i ocial in nature he thinks in terms of the household and 
the village. When be refer Lo the welfare of lhe body his approach is 
utilitarian. He also think that authoritarian methods are the most effi-
cient, creating the condiUons for the satisfaction of necessitie . Once 
these needs have been sa ti fied, the Maimonidean person is free to seek 
religiou perfection in an individualistic way. The ocial virtues are 
merely in trumental.JO So they were for classical antiquity too. But there, 
and the point i important enough to bear repetition the sequel wa in 
the eeking of political virtues, the free man playing a role among hi 
peer . The Maimonidean equel i not in citizen hip but in seeking 
religious perfection, in a lUrning to God by way of turning inward. 
There is np turning to fellow human a beings with whom co-operation 
is valuable in itself. 
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He who heeds Maimonides has no political ends. This is not surpris· 
ing. He knew himself to be in Exile; he wrote for his brethren. 
III 
I have been arguing so far that the Torah, as understood by Maimonides 
in the Guide. does not pre uppose a Jewish state. Now that we turn to 
the account given of prophecy in that work it is necessary to defend thi 
interpretation, a a preliminary step, against a po sible objection. lt i 
clear enough that Strauss31 and others have good grounds for describing 
the prophet as not only a teacher but also as a political leader. Further, 
Maimonides holds that prophets are legislaters. These considerations, it 
could now be argued make it unjustified to deny the Torah, as I have 
done, a fully fledged political significance. In defending my own reading 
of Maimonides, 1 offer the following explanation. 
In essaying an account of prophecy Maimonides had a triple ta k. The 
first was to give a philosophically satisfactory explanation of prophecy; 
the second was to make this explanation fit the historical, i.e. criptural-
ly recorded, phenomena of prophecy. In this context it must be 
remembered that prophecy flouri hed in the period of kingdom and, so, 
the prophets did, in fact , have a very definite political role. Thirdly, and 
most importantly it wa part of the task that Maimonides set himself 
that the account he is to give of hi toricaJ prophecy must be not only 
philosophically adequate but it mu t aJso serve a a doctrine of legitima-
tion of the Torah a halakhica.lly interpreted. Thus, the non-political 
Torah 'of our time' i to be legitimated as a descendant of, and essential-
ly identical with, the Torah of the political period. This is the reason 
why there is no outright rejection of the political claim and its virtual 
disappearance had to be discovered, in the previous section, by consider-
ing in detail the contents of the so-called political notions of 
Maimonides. In other words, I am suggesting that here, as on many 
other points, Maimonides is elusive:. He does not come clean on the 
political issue. But there is no mistaking of his intention in the pro-
phetology. I take this meaning to be as follows: 
The prophet is dead but his authority is alive; his exhortations are as 
valid in the 12th century (or in the 20th century) as they were when first 
spoken. Whatever changes occurred in the meantime e.g. the collapse of 
Jewish political independence are of no importance as far as the 
authoritativeness of the prophet is concerned. His words, originally 
meant for the ears of Jewish kings and their Jewish subject , are till the 
source of the authority of religious leaders in charge of a stateless 
religious community. This authority is binding even in the absence of 
political independence. Indeed, it is binding quite independently of any 
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political contingency. Perhaps there is that much truth in the claim that 
the Torah is the constitution of an ideal state that it is certainly not the 
constitution of any possible state but that of religious community that 
can exist under any state and so, in a sense, is above all of them. These 
preliminary remarks should be kept in mind for the remainder of this 
paper. 
It is manifest that the phenomenon of prophecy is an embarrassment 
to someone who is not only under a religious obligation to believe in the 
veracity of prophecy but who is also a philosopher. There would be no 
difficulty in accepting prophets as unusual individuals, blessed or cursed 
with a very strong imagination and great gifts of poetic expression, but 
without crediting their dicta with truth. Plato dealt with poets just in 
this way. He recognized that they were marvellous beings but, all the 
same, he would have them banished from the Republic precisely 
because they do not teach truth and, as such, are dangerous. But had 
Maimonides gone Plato's way, he could not have possibly used pro-
phecy as a source of obligatory law. Maimonides' prophetology is the 
result of these conflicting clues. 
Maimonides distinguishes, among unusually gifted people, between 
those having an exceptionally powerful intellect and those having a 
strong imagination; the former are philosophers while the latter are the 
rulers and politicians. Both characteristics are joined only in the pro-
phet.32 The possession of these qualities is only a necessary but not a suf-
ficient condition of prophecy. The prophet must teach truth and he 
must also be morally blameless.33 In addition, it is necessary that he be 
chosen by God for the role of prophet. Thus, in the last resort, prophecy 
is an arbitrary gift of God. As for the question 'how is truth 
recognized?', we shall see presently that the test of that is a particular 
and pre-eminent prophecy. 
Philosophically, of course, the intriguing problem lies in attributing to 
prophets intellectual perfection. Why Maimonides had to do this is clear 
enough. The practical domain is a subject-matter of theory and, as such, 
subject to theoretical criticism. Now, if the philosopher were assumed to 
be intellectually superior to the legislator whose strength lies in his im-
agination then the former could easily refute the dicta of the latter, 
whether on factual or on logical grounds. A man of mere imagination is 
as likely to get his facts wrong as he is likely to be confused in his think-
ing. In order to protect the prophet from this kind of treatment at the 
hand of philosophers, as exemplified in Plato's treatment of poets, 
Maimonides endowed the prophet with perfect theoretical wisdom; no 
rhilosopher can lay claim to greater perfection than that. It is important 
to cmrhasizc that the theoretical wisdom of the prophet is perfect and 
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complete; no one el e can attain the same degree of A 
Shem Tov comment on lhi ' it i impossible that someone hould be a 
prophet without being theoretically perfect . The philo opher who in-
creases his theoretical competence by his own effort , could never reach 
thi highest level. How the prophet attain this level is slightly 
mysterious; on this point according to Maimonides there is a difference 
between Mo es and the other prophet . The latter who are our concern 
now seem to attain by imagination what could have been arrived at 
from theoretical prerni se .35 Echoing thi Abravanel in hi commen-
tary36 says that if the imaginative faculty is very trong in the prophet 
he will imagine what he could have derived from the relevant premisses. 
I say that this is my teriou . For Maimonides a a tudent of Plato 
must have known that there is all the difference in the world between 
knowing a true propo. it ion and knowing why it is true. A person who 
gets something or indeed everything right, ha only true opinion; only he 
who know the proof can be aid to have knowledge. It would be neat if 
we could interpret Maimonides a saying that prophets had true 
opinions while Mo es aJone had complete knowledge. But, strangely 
enough he does insist that all prophets were perfectly wi e.31 
We could attempt to clear up the matter in Ari totelian terms. We 
could say that Maimonides operates with the two kind of Aristotelian 
wisdom the theoretical and the practical. One difficulty in this approach 
is that Ari totle himself has never cleared up the relationship between 
the two kinds of wisdom. Is iL possible for omeone to po ess practical 
wisdom, which includes the capacity of choo ing the right means to a 
given end but not theoretical wisdom? Suppose he hold a fal e theory 
and, a a consequence, rnakes a mistake in fact. Will not this cir-
cumstance make it impossible for him to choose the right mean given 
that the choice of the right means is dependent on knowing the facts? 
Aristotle's view eems to be that in the truly wi e man both kind of 
wisdom will be found. His statement on the matter i from a theoretical 
point of view far from atisfactory. 
Now aU the states we have considered converge, as might be ex-
pected to the arne point; for when we speak of judgement and 
understanding and practical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit 
the same people with possessing judgement and having reached 
year of reason and with having practical wi dom and understan-
ding.31 
This is no account of the relationship; it imply says that contingent· 
ly both kinds of wisdom are to be found in the same people. To the 
same degree? l possession of one kind of wisdom a mean of acquiring 
the other? 
66 Religious Traditions 
Given that Aristotle has no answer to these questions, it would not be 
difficult to attribute to prophets a high degree of practical wisdom. Since 
it is not clear how one comes by this kind of wisdom, there is no reason 
to assume that prophets could not come by it. The real problem is in the 
attribution of theoretical wisdom. For, even if Aristotle does not explain 
the fact of convergence of the two kinds of wisdom in the same people, 
he certainly has an account about how one acquires theoretical wisdom. 
This is a matter of learning not only the facts, as it were, but also the 
theories which explain them. Thus, if the prophet is said to be in posses-
sion of theoretical wisdom then it is implied that he knows not merely 
facts but the relevant theories and proofs. However, if this were so then 
he would not need imaginative leaps. To say here that the prophet might 
grasp, as Aristotle insisted is necessary, by intuition those basic truths 
which are to be the very basic premisses, is not much help. For Aristotle 
also insists that from these intuitively grasped premisses one proceeds to 
theoretical knowledge by finding ever new middle terms i.e. by in-
ference. And the prophet does not seem to be engaged in inferences. 
Thus we are led to the same difficulty we encountered when we tried to 
read Maimonides in Plato's terms. And yet, the Guide attributes 
theoretical wisdom to prophets. As I said earlier, it is a philosophical em-
barrassment. The real extent of the discomfort that Maimonides must 
have felt on this score will be readily appreciated once we consider his 
account of the special prophetic status of Moses. 
That Moses was quite different from all other prophets, whether they 
preceded or succeeded him, is central not only to the contents of 
Maimonides' prophetology but also to its function. That function, I 
maintain, is the key to the understanding of the doctrine and of much 
else besides. But first let me give a brief exposition of the grounds on the 
basis of which Maimonides attributes uniqueness to Moses. It seems to 
me that the special qualities of Moses could be listed under three 
headings. There are, first of all, those differences whose unique ap-
plicability to Moses is derived from Scripture. Secondly, there is a 
philosophical difference, it being rather unclear whether it is an in-
ference from the propositions asserting the scriptural differences. Lastly, 
and most importantly, there is an institutional difference. It is my con-
tention that the first two kinds of difference are in the service of the 
third and that their rationale rests in their being support for it. Let us 
take these now in turn. 
The only characteristics that Maimonides lists explicitly as differences 
in kinds of prophecy, between Moses and all the other prophets, are the 
rour scrirtural They are: 
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I. Other prophets prophesied in a dream or in swoon; Moses was wide 
awake. 
2. ther prophets were spoken to by God through a messenger; with 
Mo es He spoke face to face. 
3. Other prophets faced God in fear and trembling; Moses spoke to Him 
as a man speaks to his fellow. 
4. Other prophets spoke with inspiration only at intervals; Moses spoke 
as a prophet any time he wished. 
The philosophical difference is that while in the case of all other pro-
phet there wa alway a very strong element of imagination in their pro-
phecie with Mo es the imaginative faculty did not enter his prophecy'; 
hi prophecy came through the influence of the active intellect only i.e. 
without any mediation by the imaginative faculty.411 Other prophets 
poke in Mo e spoke clearly and li terally. Whether these 
claim on behalf of are borne out by Scripture is, to say the least, 
doubtful. Abravanel, commenting on this pa age, rejects the view of 
Maimonides and argues that other prophet , n tably the patriarch and 
lsaish, also spoke clearly and withoul making usc of parables. What i at 
i ue here is, of cour e, the attribution of perfect theoretical wi dom to 
Moses. As we have seen thi quality was attributed to other prophets 
too but only together with imagination. We recall that in our discussion 
of this point we had to leave a un olved the question: what 'together', 
here, stands for? Be the solution to that problem whatever it may be, it i 
abundantly clear that whatever doubt Maimonjde may have had 
about the nature of the theoretical wi dom possessed by other prophets, 
he expressed none concerning It is manifestly clear that he wa 
committed to the view that Moses not only knew all true propositions 
but that he knew the proofs of every one of them as well. Moses, so 
Maimonides claim , wa the most perfect philo opher possible. 
The institutional difference is that Mo ·es provides the defining 
characteristic of the Torah as such. The call to the Torah that I rael has 
been called is the call to the Torah o/Moses. Other prophets can only 
repeat the message of Moses but they cannot deviate from it. The Torah 
of Moses is immutable. He brought it to earth and since then, in words 
already quoted and to be quoted again in this study, 'it is not in Heaven' 
(Deut. 30 12).41 That i , the T rah of Moses cannot be changed even at 
the will of Heaven. The commentary of Shem Tov on this section is 
charmingly candid: other prophets can only exhort u to ob erve the 
Torah but they do not make, like Mo es, Torah and religion (dm/7}'. 42 
Thi in tilutional difference is the core of the legitimation of the 
halakha. 
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Maimonides held, then, that there will never be anyone who will 
equal Moses either in understanding or in deeds.43 Let us examine now a 
little further what Maimonides could have meant when he attributed to 
Moses perfect understanding. As said, there is no uncertainty in what 
Maimonides says. He endows Moses with theoretical knowledge of a 
kind that never has been nor will ever be surpassed by anyone else. 
Given that other prophets also knew everything, the superiority of 
Moses must be not in what he knew, since nothing can be added to 
everything, but in the way he knew. Moses knew what he knew purely 
intellectually i.e. without any help from imagination. It is sufficient 
merely to understand what claim Maimonides is making here in order to 
realize its complete absurdity. It is indeed strange to think that a Spinoza 
found it necessary to present a detailed refutation of this claim. For the 
claim is that Moses knew all that is ever possible to know in the 
theoretical sciences. These latter Maimonides understood in Aristotelian 
terms. Thus, theoretical science included, for example, physics. If the 
claim is true then Moses knew not only all of Aristotelian physics but 
also all of Newtonian and Einsteinian physics; indeed, Moses must have 
known the physical theory that will some day be accepted as the 'final 
truth' in physics. There is, of course, no reason for believing anything of 
this sort. The Pentateuch, traditionally attributed to the authorship of 
Moses, bears no evidence of any scientific expertise in the author. In-
terestingly enough, Maimonides himself, at many points of exegesis, 
needs all the ingenuity he can muster in order to give some Biblical 
passage an interpretation that is not, as the literal reading is, in manifest 
contradiction to the scientific truth that Maimonides believed in. It is 
quite incredible to me that Maimonides could have actually believed 
that Moses was that sort of super-scientist. Were it not for the fact that 
function of the doctrine of patently institutional, i.e. it is designed to vin-
dicate the obligatoriness of the halakha that is associated with the name 
of Moses, there would be no way of avoiding the conclusion that 
Maimonides was plainly dishonest here. As it is, being the staunch 
halakist that he was, he must have felt at least very uncomfortable, 
when he thought of this doctrine in his philosophical moments. 
We may well wonder why Maimonides needed all this. Why did he 
not follow the rabbinic tradition which, in the non-historical spirit 
typical of it, holds that the patriarchs already lived by Mosaic law since 
God privately revealed it to them in advance. That is, Maimonides could 
have asserted, and sometimes he seems to do so, that whatever pertains 
to conduct, the Aristotelian practical science, has been revealed by God 
while theoretical science has not. For to hold that God revealed 
theoretical truths to Moses is to hold either that God communicated 
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re ult and theorems or that He communicated proofs. The absorption 
of either take time and effort and so, claiming theoretical perfection for 
Moses Maimonides is actually suggesting that Moses was engaged in 
theoretical work demanding intellectual effort. Nothing needs to be said 
to show how absurd all this is. 
We conclude, then, that there is no reason but the institutional to at-
tribute theoretical perfection to Moses. In itself it is a mere dogmatic 
assertion without anything, even remotely plausible, to support it. As an 
institutional doctrine, however, it does make sense and it is not more 
false than many other myths of legitimation. 
Consider again the four scriptural differences betwe n Moses and 
other prophet . They do not refer to any exces knowledge in Moses but 
each of them indicates the unique standing of Mo es in relation to God. 
This special standing i the guarantee of the absolute validity of the 
Torah 'made' a Shem Tov put it, by Moses. He is the founder· all 
other can never b more than mere followers. What is unique about 
Moses is not his knowledge but his standing. We can see now how clecp 
is the gap between this, authentically Jewish, interpretation of Mo es 
and prophecy and the Christian interpretation, as ex mplified by J.G. 
Mueller. Mueller argues that the criterion that distinguishes the true 
prophet from the fa! e one is not le:gal-political standing but the 'inspir-
ing pirit'. 44 From a Maimonidean point of view, the determination of 
where the inspiring spirit resides is a matter of standing. 
The attribution of perfect theoretical knowledge, then, has no in-
dependent philo ophical ignificance. It is nothing but a consequence of 
the in titutional need to attribute every possible kind of perfection to the 
Founder. Is it too far-fetched to assume that this doctrine, very much 
against the intentions of its author, contributed to the development of 
that obscurantist attitude that characterized, in centuries to come, the 
contemptuous rabbinic apprai al of all secular knowledge? It is common-
ly expressed in thi way: 'there is no point in studying it since if it is true 
then it is already contained in the Torah and can be found there: if it is 
false it is harmful'. 
This attitude goes back to the time when the Biblical canon was deter-
mined. At that time the sages said that anyone who brings into his house 
more than the twenty-four books of the Bible, (e.g. the book of Ben Sira 
and other apocrypha}, bring conf'u ion into his home. All orthodoxy is 
defensive; rabbinic orthodoxy, for historical reasons, more so than 
others. It is necessary for it, then to have the best sort of protective 
shield. Moses, on whom the whole tradition depends, must, therefore 
have had perfect theoretical knowledge if his authority and the authori-
ty of his Torah is to remain forever beyond the reach of all possible 
challenge. 
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IV 
It is obviOLJS from what has been said that Maimonides did not go to all 
this trouble in order to establish some truths about the historical Moses. 
His aim was rather to lay as firm foundations as possible for the halakha 
that derives from Moses. In the pursuit of that aim Maimonides did not 
hesitate to depart from the plain meaning of the Bible- a point that is 
at the centre of Spinoza's criticism of the Maimonidean reading of Scrip-
ture. There is no doubt that, as far as prophecy is concerned, 'the view 
most remote from the simple one of the Bible is the rationalistic stand-
point of Maimonides'. 45 What is not always realized that Maimonides 
did all this in order to establish rabbinic authority. For that purpose it is 
necessary not only that the historical phenomenon of prophecy be 
recruited to serve as a link in the succession to be legitimated but also to 
lay down clear boundaries to the validity of any possible prophecy 
whatever. We have seen already that it is part of the doctrine that any 
future prophecy that is in conflict with the Torah of Moses is false. In-
deed it is central to the rabbinic doctrine of legitimation that, with the 
establishment of the authority of the sages, prophecy as such has ceased 
in Israel. Late-come would-be prophets, e.g. Jesus, are clearly illegitimate 
in the light of these criteria. Moreover, not only latter-day 'prophets' but 
canonical ones as well must yield to the authority of the sages who are, 
according to the same official doctrine, their legitimate successors. The 
opinion of Talmudic sages on the subject is clear though hardly surpris-
ing: 
Who ranks higher, a prophet or a sage? It follows from Psalms 
XC, 12. ('So teach us to number our days that we may get us a 
heart of wisdom') that the sage ranks higher than the prophet.46 
The Torah of Moses is the basic norm and his unique prophecy its 
precondition. What it is that the Torah of Moses teaches in respect to 
any specific problem, is to be determined by the normative modes of in-
terpretation. These modes, in their turn, are specified by reference to 
legitimate succession. Thus, whoever openly teaches that the Torah of 
Moses should be set aside is a false prophet and/or a rebel. A legitimate 
successor, however, may teach what is manifestly contrary to the Torah 
of Moses, provided his teaching is derived from the Torah of Moses ac-
cording to accepted and, therefore, normative rules. 47 From this point of 
view whatever differences there are, on the question of immutability of 
Mosaic law, between Maimonides and others who stand within the rab-
binic, as contrasted with the Karaite, tradition, are of little consequence. 
Crescas, for example, maintained against Maimonides that the Torah is 
not absolutely immutable but that it is continuously perfectable.48 This 
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kind of difference of opinion is in titutionally meaningles . For when 
doe a change count as a change? Surely when the rules of interpreta-
tion say o. But the fiction that underlies the rules of interpretation i 
precisely that their application can bring about no real change. Thus 
what is obviously, as a matter of fact a radical change, and in view of 
the needs of the time a step towards perfection , can till be represented 
as the 'immutable T rah of Moses. What wa wrong with J sus was his 
standing not his intentions; the latter were pretty orthodox from a rab· 
binic point of view: 
Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am 
not come to destroy, but to fulfil. 49 
I have been arguing that the true function of Maimonides prophetology 
is in titutional and that, consequently, the philo ophical parts of the 
doctrine must be read a ubservient to the institutional and viz. the 
legitimation of the halakha. This reading i confirmed by Maimonides 
himself when he peak with the voice of the halakhi t. In the introduc· 
tion to his commentary on the Mishna, Order Zera'im. he explicitly 
denies prophet any halakhic authority. A prophet who contradict the 
Torah, a legitimately interpreted, is a false prophet and mu t be put to 
death. And here he quotes again Deur. 30 12, 'it i not in heaven' 50 a 
ver e we come to recognize by now as a kind of charter of rabbinic 
authority against which even God is powerless. That authority though 
founded upon prophets al o super edes them. Prophecy performed it 
historical role in having served as a foundali n; it ha now no further 
purpo e. Moreover, it must also be treated wHh the sort of uspicion 
that i appropriate to subversive elements. What matter now is authori· 
ty and stability. Organized religion is bound to issue in the subordination 
f God to His appointed servants. In a celebrated passage, much used to 
legitimate the authority of the Church, Jesus said to Peter: 
And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and 
whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and 
whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. 51 
It is impo ible not to hear in these word an echo of'it is not in heaven. 
That ubtle expo itor of institutional logic the rand lnqui itor, ha 
many incarnation in history. One of them wa the philosopher 
Maimonides.52 He was also a theocrat· he appeared to be peak ing of the 
state when, in fact, he was concerned with the ju tificatory theory and 
practice of the internal discipline of a religiou community. 
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